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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a formal representation of inference control on information flow theory in logic programming.
In order to control the fact that the result returned by a query can convey confidential information, we propose
the notion of indistinguishability of flow and elaborate definitions of protection mechanisms, secure mechanisms,
precise mechanisms and confidentiality policies based on this notion. We give a secure and precise protection
mechanism that prohibits any undesirable inferences and minimizes the number of denials of legitimate actions.
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1. Introduction
Data security is the science and study of methods of protect-
ing data in computer and communication systems from unau-
thorized disclosure and modification. One of the aspects of data
security is the control of information flow in the system. In
some sense, an information flow should describe controls that
regulate the dissemination of information. These controls are
needed to prevent programs from leaking confidential data, or
from disseminating classified data to users with lower security
clearances. The theory of information flow is well defined for
imperative programming. Different models of information flow
were proposed, namely, the Bell-LaPadula Model [1], nonlattice
and nontransitive models [2, 3] of information flow, and nonde-
ductibility and noninterference [4]. Each model has rules about
the conditions under which information can move throughout
the system. For example, in the Bell-LaPadula Model which
describes a lattice-based information flow policy, information
can flow from an object in security level A to a subject in se-
curity level B if and only if B dominates A. Both compile-time
mechanisms [5] and runtime mechanisms [6] supporting the
checking of information flows were also proposed. Intuitively,
information flows from an object x to an object y if the applica-
tion of a sequence of commands causes the information initially
in x to affect the information in y. For example, the sequence
tmp := x; y := tmp; has information flowing from x to y because
the value of x at the beginning of the sequence is revealed when
the value of y is determined at the end of the sequence. Several
studies [7] addressed information flow in imperative program-
ming, but none were concerned to bring answers of what could
be an information flow in security systems for logic program-
ming. In fact, logic programming is a well-known declarative
method of knowledge representation and programming based
on the idea that the language of first-order logic is well-suited
for both representing data and describing desired outputs. Logic
programming was developed in the early 1970s based on work
in automated theorem proving, in particular, on Robinson’s
resolution principle.
Many researchers tried to link the first order logic with
secure systems. DeTreville [8] introduced the concept of an open
logic-based security language that encodes security statements
as components of communicating distributed logic programs,
used to express security statements in a distributed system.
Bertino et al. [9] proposed a formal framework for reasoning
about access control models. The proposed framework is based
on a logical formalism and is general enough to model different
access control models. Each instance of the proposed framework
corresponded to a C-Datalog program, interpreted according to
a stable model semantics.
Wang et al. [10] presented a framework that models ac-
cess control using logic programming with set constraints of a
computable set theory. The framework specified policies as strat-
ified constraint flounder-free logic programs that admit primitive
recursion.
Bai et al. [11] proposed a knowledge oriented formal lan-
guage to specify the system security policies and their reasoning
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in response to system resource access request. The semantics
of the language was provided by translating it into epistemic
logic program in which knowledge related modal operators are
employed to represent agents’ knowledge in reasoning.
Coetzee et al. [12] defined a logic-based access control
approach for Web Service endpoint. A logic-based authorization
manager provided formal foundation of logical reasoning, that
enforced the consistency of access control decisions over the
resources of Web Services.
Information flow in logic programming was introduced in
[13, 14]. Yaacoub et al. defined the information flow in logic
programming and developed mechanism to detect such flows. In
this paper, we extend the previously presented information flow
theory in logic programming to the field of inference control.
In section 2, we briefly discuss the syntax and semantics and
information flow detection mechanisms in Datalog logic pro-
gramming. In section 3, we introduce the indistinguishability of
the flow in logic programming. We extend this definition and
propose the notion of level of goals in logic programming. In
section 4, we formally define protection mechanisms, secure
mechanisms and confidentiality policies. We end the section by
giving specifications of secure protection mechanism for deduc-
tive databases using the previously exposed notions. We then
give a formal proof of the security of this protection mechanism.
2. Framework
2.1 Syntax and Semantics
We consider here the first order predicate logic [15] lan-
guage denoted L. This language has countable disjoint sets of
variables and predicate symbols. In this language, a term is a
variable or a constant. We denote the Herbrand universe of L
by UL, which consists of the set of all ground terms that can
be formed with the constants in L. Recall that a ground term
is a term where no variable occurs in it. An atom, denoted
p(t1, · · · , tn), is obtained by applying an n-ary predicate symbol
p to n terms ti (1≤ i≤ n). An expression A← B1, · · · ,Bn where
A,B1, · · · ,Bn are atoms, is called a clause: A its head and
B1, · · · ,Bn its body. An expression with an empty head is a
goal (an empty goal is denoted ), while an expression with
an empty body is a fact. A finite set of predicate definitions
constitutes a logic program.
An idempotent mapping from a finite set of variables to
terms is called a substitution. ε denotes the identity sub-
stitution.
An SLD-derivation for a goal G =← A1, · · · ,An with re-
spect to a program P is a sequence of goals G0, · · · ,Gi,Gi+1,
· · · , such that G0 = G, and if Gi = B1,· · · ,Bm, then Gi+1 =
θB1,· · · ,θBi−1,θB′1, · · · , θB
′
k,θBi+1, · · · ,θBm such that 1≤ i≤
m, and B← B′1,· · · ,B
′
k is a variant of a clause in P.
From goal Gi, we obtain Gi+1 by means of a resolution step, and
Bi is said to be the resolved atom. A derivation that is finite and
maximal (i.e. the final goal Gn can not be resolved), is called a
terminating computation:
• If Gn is the empty goal then, we say that P∪{G} suc-
ceeds and the computation is said to succeed with answer
substitution θ , where θ is the substitution obtained by
restricting the substitution θn · · ·θ1 to the variables occur-
ring in G;
• If Gn is not the empty goal, then the computation is said
to fail. We say that P∪{G} fails if all computations from
G in P fail;
• If the derivation is infinite, the computation does not
terminate.
2.2 Information flow in Datalog Logic Programming
The theory of information flow in logic programming is
based on the innovative work done by Yaacoub et al. [13, 14].
They proposed several definitions for flow detection. These
definitions correspond to what can be observed by the user
when a query G(x,y) is run on a logic program P.
The first definition is based on Success/Failure (SF) of the
goals. Let P be a Datalog program and G(x,y) be a two variables
goal. There is a flow of information from x to y in P (x SF−→
P
G y
based on SF in goal G and Program P) if and only if there exists
a,b ∈UL(P) such that P∪{G(a,y)}1 succeeds and P∪{G(b,y)}
fails. This means that when the user only sees the outputs of
computations in terms of successes and failures, there exists two
different a,b ∈UL(P) such that the user can distinguish between
the outputs of the goals without seeing what concerns a and b.
Now let us show an example to make it clearer.
Example 2.1. Let P be a program:
p(a,b)←;
p(c,b)←;
and let G(x,y) be the following goal: ← p(x,y)
Since P∪{G(a,y)} succeeds and P∪{G(b,y)} fails, then x SF−→
P
G
y based on SF, goal G and Program P. In other words, if we
hide a and b from the goals and since the first goal succeeds
and the second one fails, we can distinguish by looking at the
facts that the first constant is a whereas the second one is b,
consequently the flow occurs.
The second definition is based on the substitution answers of
the goals. Let P be a Datalog program and G(x,y) be a goal. We
can say that there is an information flow from x to y in G(x,y)
with respect to substitution answers in P if and only if there ex-
ists a,b ∈UL(P) such that θ(P∪{G(a,y)}) 6= θ(P∪{G(b,y)}).
In this definition, the user only sees the outputs of computations
in terms of substitution answers. Consequently, there is a flow
of information from x to y if this user can distinguish the outputs
of P∪{G(a,y)} and P∪{G(b,y)}.
Example 2.2. Let us consider the following example of program
P:
p(a,b)←;
p(c,d)←;
1P∪{G(a,y)} means running the goal G(a,y) on the program P.
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and let G(x,y) be the following goal: ← p(x,y)
Since θ(P∪{G(a,y)}) = {y→ b} and θ(P∪{G(b,y)}) = /0,
there is a flow from x to y (x SA−→
P
G y) based on substitution
answers in G(x,y) and P. In other words, let us hide both a
and b from the goals. The first answer is“b”, by looking at
the facts we know that y is substituted by “b”, then “a” is the
hidden constant. Whereas in the second goal, y is substituted
by empty set, this means that the first constant is either “b” or
“d”, consequently, there is a flow.
2.2.1 Results
As in [13], the complexity results obtained for the following two
decision problems
piSF
{
Input: A logic program P, a two variables goal G(x,y)
Output: Determine whether x SF−→
P
G y
piSA
{
Input: A logic program P, a two variables goal G(x,y)
Output: Determine whether x SA−→
P
G y
are as follows:
• In the general settings of Prolog, the two decision prob-
lems are undecidable.
• If the language is restricted to Datalog programs then
determining the existence of information flows becomes
decidable.
– piSF is EXPTIME-complete for Datalog programs.
– piSA is EXPTIME-complete for Datalog programs.
3. Level of indistinguishability of informa-
tion flow in logic programming
We will proceed in this section to refine the notion of infor-
mation flow for Datalog logic programs. For this, we propose
the notion of level of indistinguishability of the flow.
For a Datalog logic program P and a goal G(x,y) with the
variable x considered as an input variable and y as an output
variable, let ≡ be a binary relation over UL(P) of cardinality n.
Let a,b be two distinct elements of UL(P).
• For the first definition of information flow (based on
success/failure), we say that a ≡ b if and only if both
P∪ {← p(a,y)} and P∪ {← p(b,y)} succeed or both
P∪{← p(a,y)} and P∪{← p(b,y)} do not succeed (in
the sense that both goals can fail or not terminate because
of the presence of loops).
• For the second definition of information flow (based on
substitution/answers), we say that:
a≡ b iff θ(P∪{← p(a,y)})∩θ(P∪{← p(b,y)}) 6=∅.
Lemma 3.1. The binary relation ≡ is reflexive.
Lemma 3.2. The binary relation ≡ is symmetric.
Lemma 3.3. The binary relation ≡ is transitive.
Lemma 3.4. ≡ is an equivalence relation.
Proof.
By lemmas 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
We note here that the definitions presented in [13, 14] rely
on the fact that for a logic program P and a goal G(x,y), an
information flow passes from x to y if one can find just two dis-
tinguishable equivalence classes. In the next subsection, we will
use this notion of equivalence classes and its cardinality to define
the level of an information flow as one of its characteristics.
3.1 Level of information flows in logic programs
In this section, we present the definitions of the level of
information flow based on the notion of equivalence classes.
Definition 3.1 (Level of a logic goal). For a Datalog logic
program P and a goal G(x,y), the level of the goal G(x,y) is
equal to the cardinality of the smallest equivalence class.
Example 3.5. Let P be the following program:
C1 : p(a,b)←;
C2 : p(a,c)←;
C3 : p(b,c)←;
C4 : p(c,b)←;
The Herbrand Universe UL(P) is equal to {a,b,c}.
For the definition of the flow based on success/failure, it is
easy to see that:
P∪{← p(a,y)} succeeds,
P∪{← p(b,y)} succeeds, and
P∪{← p(c,y)} succeeds.
Thus, a≡ b≡ c. Consequently, the cardinality of the equivalence
class corresponding to success is equal to 3, while the one
corresponding to failure is equal to 0. Thus, the level based
on success and failure which corresponds to cardinality of the
smallest equivalence class is equal to 0.
For the definition of the flow based on substitution/answers,
we have:
Θ[P∪{← p(a,y)}] = {y 7→ b,y 7→ c},
Θ[P∪{← p(b,y)}] = {y 7→ c}, and
Θ[P∪{← p(c,y)}] = {y 7→ b}.
Thus, a ≡ c, and a ≡ b. Consequently, the cardinality of each
equivalence class is equal to 2. Consequently, the level based
on substitution answers is equal to 2.
One can see that for an Herbrand universe UL(P) of cardi-
nality n, if the level of indistinguishability is n then we have 1
equivalence class which is the class of cardinality n {a1, · · · ,an}.
Theoretically, this level can be calculated for each of the
two definitions of information flow previously presented. For
example, for the first definition of flow based on success and
failure, one propose the following algorithm:
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Require: A Datalog logic program P, a goal G(x,y),
finite Herbrand Universe UL(P) = {a1, · · · ,an}
Ensure: Level of G(x,y)
begin
Levelsucc← 0; counter on the number of successful goals
Levelno−succ← 0; counter on the number of non-successful
goals
i← 1; counter on the set of the Herbrand universe
while i≤ n do
if P∪{← p(ai,y)} succeeds then
Levelsucc← Levelsucc+1;
end
else
Levelno−succ← Levelno−succ+1;
end
i← i+1;
end
return min(Levelsucc,Levelno−succ);
end
Algorithm 1: Goal level based on success/failure flow defini-
tion
Example 3.6. Let P be the same program as in example 3.5.
We saw that the level is equal to 0. By running the algorithm
on the same example, the calculated level based on success and
failure is thus equal to 0.
As for the second definition of information flow based on
substitution answers, one can write an algorithm similar to Al-
gorithm 2.
Example 3.7. Let P be the same program as in example 3.5. We
saw that the level is equal to 2. We will now run the algorithm
on the same example and prove the same result. Recall that
the Herbrand Universe is equal to {a,b,c}, and that the total
number of possible and different substitution answers for all the
possible goals P∪{← p(a,y)}, P∪{← p(b,y)} and P∪{←
p(c,y)} is equal to 2, namely, y 7→ b and y 7→ c. By running the
algorithm, the level calculated based on substitution answers is
equal to 2.
3.2 Specification of information flows in Datalog logic
programs
In order to introduce the notion of specification, we motivate
it first by giving an example.
Consider a system composed by a deductive database (rep-
resented as facts in logic programming) and a user who can run
queries (in the form of logic goals).
Example 3.8. Let P be the following program representing:
• the three floors and its corresponding departments in a
hospital
hospital( f loor1,cancerology)←;
hospital( f loor2,cardiology)←;
hospital( f loor2,urology)←;
hospital( f loor3,gynaecology)←
• and some of the patients location in the hospital
location(Ana, f loor1)←;
location(Bob, f loor1)←;
location(Carl, f loor2)←;
location(David, f loor2)←;
location(Elianor, f loor3)←
The goal is to prevent the user to know exactly for example
the existence of the exact departments on each floor or the exact
location of some specific patient.
Require: A Datalog logic program P, a goal G(x,y),
finite Herbrand Universe UL(P) = {a1, · · · ,an}, m the total
number of possible substitution answers of the y variable
for all the goals P∪{← G(a1,y)}, · · · ,P∪{← G(an,y)}.
Ensure: Level of G(x,y)
begin
table T [m]; table of counters, all initialized to 0, corresponding
to the m different substitution answers. The indexes of the table T
are the m different substitution answers and the corresponding value
represent the total number of occurrence of that substitution answer
i← 1; counter on the set of the Herbrand Universe
sub← θ [P∪{p(a1,y)}];we initialize the sub by the first
substitution answer of y
while i≤ n do
tmps←Θ[P∪{← p(ai,y)}]; as P∪{← p(ai,y)} can
have multiple substitution answers, tmps is the table
containing these substitution answers
j← 1; counter on the set of the substitution answers for the
goal P∪{← p(ai,y)}
while j <= count(tmps) do
T [tmps[ j]]← T [tmps[ j]]+1;
if T [tmps[ j]]< T [sub] then
sub← tmps[ j];
end
j← j+1;
end
i← i+1;
end
return T [sub];
end
Algorithm 2: Goal level based on substitution answers flow
definition
Definition 3.2. For a Datalog logic program P and a two goals
F(x,y) and G(x,y), we say that:
• F(x,y) is critical iff level(F(x,y)) = 1.
• F(x,y) is weaker than G(x,y) iff level(F(x,y))>
level(G(x,y)).
• F(x,y) is stronger than G(x,y) iff level(F(x,y))<
level(G(x,y)).
Example 3.9. It is easy to verify that for the definition of flow
of information based on substitution/answers, there are three
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equivalence classes for the goal P∪{← hospital(x,y)} of car-
dinalities 1 and 2. Thus the level of P∪{← hospital(x,y)} is
equal to 1. Whereas, for the goal P∪{← location(x,y)}, one
can count three equivalence classes too, two of cardinality 2
and one of cardinality 1. So, the level of P∪{← location(x,y)}
is equal to 1. Consequently, both goals are critical.
Lemma 3.10. For a Datalog logic program P and a goal F(x,y),
if F(x,y) is critical, then the output variable y reveals informa-
tion about the variable x.
Proof.
By definition, if a goal F(x,y) is critical then the level of
F(x,y) is equal to 1. Moreover, when a level of a goal is equal to
1, it means that the cardinality of the corresponding equivalence
class of the goal F(x,y) is equal to 1. Thus, the variable x will
be uniquely identified.
Example 3.11. As both goals P∪{← hospital(x,y)} and P∪
{← location(x,y)} are critical, the output variable y can convey
information as we can see next. Suppose that a user runs the
goal P∪{← hospital( f loor1,y)}, then the corresponding out-
put variable y will be unified uniquely with cancerology. Thus
the disclosure of this information will render the identification
of the probable disease of the patient residing on the first floor
very easy.
Whereas, if the user runs the goals P∪{← location(Ana,y)}
and P∪{← location(Bob,y)}, the corresponding output vari-
able y will be unified uniquely with f loor1, and the user will
still know that both Ana and Bob are sharing the same floor but
without knowing anything about their diseases. Moreover, let us
suppose that the user runs the goals P∪{← location(Carl,y)}
or P∪{← location(David,y)}, the y variable will be unified
with cardiology and urology. So Carl and David can be both
in the same cardiology or urology department or each one of
them in a different department. A natural question arises here,
what should the system do when it detects that some queries
are critical ?
As for the other forms of specifications, one can verify that
the level of the goal P∪{← location(Carl,y)} is greater than
the one of P∪{← location(Elianor,y)} and thus the last goal
is stronger than the former one.
4. Secure and Precise Security Mecha-
nisms
Based on what we have presented, one can ask the follow-
ing question: is it possible to devise a generic procedure for
developing a mechanism that is both secure and precise using
the notion of information flow for logic programs?
For this, we will consider here logic programs as a set of
clauses, having all the same predicate definition. The atoms in
this logic programs have several input positions but one single
output position. Data is brought in to a clause through the input
positions, and sent out through the output positions.
Example 4.1. Let P be the following Datalog logic program:
C1 : q(a,b)←;
C2 : r(b,a)←;
C3 : p(x,y)← q(x,z),r(z,y);
Let α,β ,γ,δ ,ζ and κ be following argument positions2 of
all the variables in the clause C3:
α =<C3,0, p,1 >, β =<C3,0, p,2 >, γ =<C3,1,q,1 >,
δ =<C3,1,q,2 >, ζ =<C3,2,r,1 > and κ =<C3,2,r,2 >.
Let α,γ and ζ be in I(C3), β ,δ and κ in O(C3). I(C3) denotes
the input positions of the clause C3 and O(C3) denotes the output
positions of the clause C3.
Seeing that the program P have three different predicate
definitions, namely, q,r and p, we can rewrite the program in
such a way to have only one predicate definition:
Let P′ be P’s equivalent program:
C′1 : t(q,a,b)←;
C′2 : t(r,b,a)←;
C′3 : t(p,x,y)← t(q,x,z), t(r,z,y)
P′ has now one predicate definition, namely t. t has 3 argu-
ments. The first two are input arguments and the last one is an
output argument. It is easy to see that P and P′ are equivalent
according to the least fixpoint semantics. Thus, one can rewrite
any logic program like P into an equivalent logic program hav-
ing one predicate definition. In the next, we will only consider
logic program composed simply of facts, and we will denote a
program P by its predicate definition.
We will represent logic programs as abstract functions:
Definition 4.1. (Logic programs as abstract functions) For a
logic program P denoted by its predicate definition
t(I1, · · · , In,O), where I1, · · · , In are input positions and O one
output position, let p be the function p : I1×·· ·× In×O→ R.
Then p is the function with n inputs positions ik ∈ Ik,1≤ k≤ n,
and one output position o ∈ O, and one result r ∈ R. O is the
set of substitution/answers associated to the output position o.
Depending on each definition of information flow, R can be
equal to {success, f ailure}, or to the set of substitution/answers
corresponding to the output position o, or to the SLD-tree of the
goal P∪{← t(i1, · · · , in,o)}.
With respect to the Lemma 3.10, we assume that the result
r ∈ R of the function p(i1, · · · , in,o) conveys information about
the input variables i1, · · · , in.
Dealing with confidentiality, a natural question arises here,
whether if the result of p(i1, · · · , in,o) contains any information
that could violate the policy. For this, protection mechanisms
are proposed. A protection mechanism produces for every input
that do not violate the policy, the same value as for p, and
for inputs that would impart confidential information an error
message. For this, let E be the set of results from a program p
that indicate errors.
2If c is a clause of the form a0← a1, · · · ,an, the position of the kth argument
of the jth literal is uniquely defined in the program P by the tuple < c, j, p,k >,
where p is the predicate symbol of the jth literal of c
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Definition 4.2. (Protection mechanism) Let p be a function
p : I1×·· ·×In×O→R. A protection mechanism m is a function
m : I1×·· ·×In→R∪E for which, when ik ∈ Ik,1≤ k≤ n, o∈O,
either
• m(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in,o) or
• m(i1, · · · , in) ∈ E
Example 4.2. We consider here a logic program P, with one
input position and one output position, that contains the age of
some individuals.
age(ann,56)←;
age(billy,27)←;
age(carl,34)←
The program P is represented by the function: age : I,O→R.
Queries would be of the form P∪{← age(ann,A)} for example.
A protection mechanism would be for example to answer cor-
rectly (in the terms of the different information flow definitions)
every query whenever its input position variable corresponds to
one of the Herbrand Universe constants. More formally, let m
be the following function:
m : I→ R∪E for which:
• m(i) = age(i,o) when i ∈UL(P), (o ∈ O)
• m(i) = Error, otherwise.
Now we define a confidentiality policy.
Definition 4.3. (Confidentiality policy) A confidentiality policy
for the logic program p : I1× ·· · × In×O→ R is a function
c : I1×·· ·× In→ J1×·· ·× Jn, where J1 ⊆ I1, · · · ,Jn ⊆ In.
Informally, the sets Ji,1≤ i≤ n corresponds to sets of inputs
that may be revealed. The function c acts as a filter by bearing
leakage of confidential inputs by seeing that the complements
of Ji with respect to Ii represent the sets of inputs that must be
kept confidential.
Example 4.3. Let c be the confidentiality policy that bears
leaking information about ann for example; thus, for c : I→ J,
where I = {ann,billy,carl} and J = {billy,carl}, c(billy) =
billy,c(carl) = carl and c(ann) is undefined.
Now we define what we hear about a secure mechanism.
Definition 4.4. (Secure mechanism) Let c : I1×·· ·× In→ J1×
·· · × Jn be a confidentiality policy for a program p. Let m :
I1× ·· · × In → R∪E be a security mechanism for the same
program p. Then the mechanism m is secure (i.e. confidential)
if and only if there is a function m′ : J1×·· ·× Jn→ R∪E such
that, for all ik ∈ Ik,1≤ k ≤ n,m(i1, · · · , in) = m′(c(i1, · · · , in)).
Example 4.4. Let us check if this security mechanism is secure
and this for the first two definitions of information flow previ-
ously presented:
Success Substitution
/failure /answers
Query: P∪{← age(billy,A)} success θ = {A 7→ 27}
Protection mec: m(billy) success θ = {A 7→ 27}
Sec. mec: m(c(billy)) success θ = {A 7→ 27}
Query: P∪{← age(diana,A)} f ailure θ = {}
Protection mec: m(diana) error error
Sec. mec: m(c(diana)) error error
Query: P∪{← age(ann,A)} success θ = {56}
Protection mec: m(ann) success θ = {56}
Sec. mec: m(c(ann)) error error
In this example, we have showed for three queries the result of
the protection mechanism, and checked if it is secure. Even if
for the first two queries, the results show that this is the case,
the third query reported a discordance. Thus, the protection
mechanism presented in this example is not secure. We will
present later in this paper a mechanism that is secure.
Despite the fact that a secure mechanism ensures that the
policy is obeyed, it may disallow actions that do not violate
it and thus be overly restrictive. Next we define the notion of
precision which measures the degree of overrestrictiveness.
Definition 4.5. Let m1 and m2 be two distinct protection mech-
anisms for the logic program p under the policy c. In the rest, o
is an output position.
Then m1 is as precise as m2 (m1  m2) provided that, for
all inputs (i1, · · · , in), if m2(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in,o), then
m1(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in,o).
We say that m1 is more precise than m2 (m1  m2) if
(m1  m2) and there is an input (i′1, · · · , i′n) such that
m1(i′1, · · · , i′n)= p(i′1, · · · , i′n,o) and m2(i′1, · · · , i′n) 6= p(i′1, · · · , i′n,o).
m1m2 implies that m1 never gives a violation notice when
m2 does not. This implies that the utility of m1 is at least as high
as of m2.
Lemma 4.5. The relation  is reflexive and transitive on the
protection mechanisms for a given p and c.
Proof.
•  is reflexive: let m1 be a protection mechanism for p and
c, then m1  m1 because for all the inputs (i1, · · · , in), if
m1(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in,o), then obviously
m1(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in,o).
•  is transitive: let m1, m2 and m3 be three protection
mechanisms for p and c such that m1  m2 and m2 
m3. m2  m3 means that for all inputs (i1, · · · , in), if
m3(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in,o), then
m2(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in,o) and m1  m2 means that
for all inputs (i1, · · · , in), if m2(i1, · · · , in)= p(i1, · · · , in,o),
then m1(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in,o).
Thus, for all inputs (i1, · · · , in), if m3(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in,o),
then m1(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in,o). This establishes that
m1  m3.
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Lemma 4.6. The relation is a strict ordering on the protec-
tion mechanisms for a given p and c.
Proof.
•  is irreflexive: let m1 be a protection mechanism for p
and c, then m1 6 m1 since there is no input (i′1, · · · , i′n)
such that m1(i′1, · · · , i′n)= p(i′1, · · · , i′n,o) and m1(i′1, · · · , i′n) 6=
p(i′1, · · · , i′n,o).
•  is asymmetric: let m1 and m2 be two protection mech-
anisms for p and c such that m1 m2. m1 m2 implies
that m1  m2 and there is an input (i′1, · · · , i′n) such that
m1(i′1, · · · , i′n) = p(i′1, · · · , i′n,o) and
m2(i′1, · · · , i′n) 6= p(i′1, · · · , i′n,o).
Thus, m2 6 m1, since there will be the input
(i′1, · · · , i′n) for which m1(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in,o), but
m2(i1, · · · , in)
6= p(i1, · · · , in,o). Thus is asymmetric.
•  is transitive: let m1, m2 and m3 be three protection
mechanisms for p and c such that m1  m2 and m2 
m3. m2  m3 implies that (m2  m3) and there is an
input (i′1, · · · , i′n) such that m2(i′1, · · · , i′n) = p(i′1, · · · , i′n,o)
and m3(i′1, · · · , i′n) 6= p(i′1, · · · , i′n,o). m1m2 means that
(m1  m2) and there is an input (i”1, · · · , i”n) such that
m2(i”1, · · · , i”n) = p(i”1, · · · , i”n,o) and
m3(i”1, · · · , i”n) 6= p(i”1, · · · , i”n,o).
Thus, there is an input (i′1, · · · , i′n) such that m1(i′1, · · · , i′n)
= p(i′1, · · · , i′n,o) and m3(i′1, · · · , i′n) 6= p(i′1, · · · , i′n,o).
Since the relation  is transitive, the relation is thus
transitive.
Example 4.7. For the same previous example, let m1 : I→R∪E
be the following protection mechanism
• m1(i) = p(i,o) when i ∈UL(P),
• m1(i) = Error, otherwise.
and m2 : I→ R∪E a protection mechanism that uses a counter
cn on the number of queries already asked. cn is initialized to 1,
and incremented by 1 on every query ran against the program.
• m2(i) = p(i,o) when cn%2 = 0,
• m2(i) = Error, otherwise.
Suppose that the user asks the following set of queries : {P∪
{← age(billy,A),P∪{← age(ann,A),P∪{← age(david,A)}.
Next, we will be interested only with the second definition of
flow, i.e. based on substitution/answers, as it could be easily
generalized to the other definitions.
The corresponding answers are as follows: θ = {A 7→ 27},
θ = {A 7→ 56} and θ = {}.
For the first protection mechanism, the answers would be re-
spectively, θ = {A 7→ 27}, θ = {A 7→ 56} and error, while
for the second protection mechanism, the answers would be
θ = {A 7→ 27}, error and θ = {} respectively.
In this example, m2 is not as precise as m1, because m1(ann)=
p(ann,o) and m2(ann) 6= p(ann,o). m1 is not as precise as m2,
because m2(david) = p(david,o) and
m1(david) 6= p(david,o). Thus, one cannot establish that m1
m2 or m2 m1. A question arises here, what about combining
two protection mechanisms?
By combining two protection mechanisms, we obtain a new
mechanism that is as precise as the two original ones.
Definition 4.6 (Union of protection mechanisms). Let m1 and
m2 be protection mechanisms for the program p. Then their
union m3 = m1∪m2 is defined as
m3(i1, · · · , in)

= p(i1, · · · , in,o) when
m1(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in,o) or
m2(i1, · · · , in) = p(i1, · · · , in,o)
= m1(i1, · · · , in) otherwise.
One can see that the previous definition is not symmetric,
since m1∪m2 6= m2∪m1.
Example 4.8. For the same logic program in example 4.2, let
m1 : I→ R∪E be the following protection mechanism
• m1(i) = p(i,o) when i ∈UL(P)\{ann},
• m1(i) = Error, otherwise.
and m2 : I→ R∪E the following one:
• m2(i) = p(i,o) when i ∈UL(P),
• m2(i) = Error, otherwise.
Then,
m3(ann) = m1(ann)∪m2(ann) = m2(ann) = p(ann,o)
m3(billy) = m1(billy)∪m2(billy) = m1(billy) = p(billy,o)
m3(carl) = m1(carl)∪m2(carl) = m1(carl) = p(carl,o)
Note that here m2 m1.
From this definition and the definitions of secure and precise,
we have:
Theorem 4.9 (Union of secure protection mechanisms). Let m1
and m2 be secure protection mechanisms for a program p and
policy c. Then m1∪m2 is also a secure protection mechanism
for p and c. Furthermore, m1∪m2  m1 and m1∪m2  m2.
From secure protection mechanisms m1,m2 · · · , one can de-
fine the secure protection mechanism m∗ = m1∪m2∪·· · such
that m∗  m1,m∗  m2, · · · . Thus, we have the following gener-
alization of the previous theorem:
Theorem 4.10. For any program p and security policy c, there
exists a precise, secure mechanism m∗ such that, for all secure
mechanisms m associated with p and c, m∗  m.
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Proof.
Let m = {m′|m′ is a secure protection mechanism for p and
c}. Let m∗ be ∪n∈mn. Then by Theorem 4.9, m∗  n for any
secure protection mechanism m∗; hence, m∗ is maximal.
m∗ is the mechanism that ensures security while minimizing
error messages.
Example 4.11. We consider here a logic program P , with one
input position and one output position, that contains the salary
of some individuals in euros.
salary(abby,2500)←;
salary(bob,2500)←;
salary(carla,2400)←
The program P is represented by the function: salary :
I,O→ R.
Let c be the confidentiality policy that bears leaking informa-
tion about all input variables, namely abby,bob and carla. Thus,
for c : I→ J, where I = {abby,bob,carla} and J = {}, c(abby)
is undefined, c(bob) is undefined and c(carla) is undefined.
A trivial protection mechanism for example, would be in this
case to not answer any query. Formally, let m be the following
function:
m : I→ R∪E for which:
• m(i) = no answer, where i ∈UL(P).
Obviously, this protection mechanism is secure, but what
about the existence of mechanisms that are both secure and
precise in the sense that the mechanism ensures security while
minimizing the number of denials of legitimate actions. For this,
we will use the notion of level of a flow, previously presented in
section 3 to define our secure protection mechanism. In this ex-
ample, we allow the observer to see the query sequences issued
by the users and to have some a priori knowledge by retaining
all previously returned answers. Note that in the query se-
quences visualized by the observer, the input parameters are
kept hidden.
Recall that for every query ← p(i,o} in a program p, we
associate an equivalence class, denoted o¯, and thus a cardinal-
ity. In the program p above, abby ≡ bob, since Θ(P∪{←
p(abby,o}) =Θ(P∪{← p(bob,o}) = {o 7→ 2500}, and conse-
quently the card(2500) = 2. One can see that card(2400) = 1.
For our protection mechanism, we associate to each equiv-
alent class of cardinality higher or equal than 1, a random
number α > 1.
As long as the queries are asked, the system counts the
number of queries asked in each equivalence class. If the level
associated to the query is equal to 1, the protection mechanism
will respond by no answer. Also, when the number of queries
corresponding to an equivalence class is equal to its associated
random number α , the protection mechanism will respond by
no answer. Otherwise, the protection mechanism will answer
the query by giving its substitution answer sets.
Formally, let m be the following protection mechanism:
m : I→ R∪E for which:
• m(i) = no answer, if for P∪{← p(i,o)}, card(o¯) = 1,
• m(i) = no answer, if for P∪{← p(i,o)}, nco¯ = αo¯,
• m(i) = p(i,o), otherwise.
Above, nco¯ is a counter corresponding to the number of queries
already asked associated to the equivalence class of the goal
P∪{← p(i,o)}.
Let the random numbers associated be as follows:
α2500 = 1, and α2400 = 1.
As stated earlier, the observer can visualize query sequences
with the input parameter hidden (in the next shown in red) and
can have some a priori knowledge. An a priori knowledge that
should not contain any information about the random numbers
α , because an omniscient observer can easily violate the confi-
dentiality policy, as shown next:
Suppose that the observer sees the following query sequences:
{P∪{← salary(abby,o)},P∪{← salary(abby,o)},
P∪{← salary(bob,o)},P∪{← salary(carla,o)}}.
Let Query 1 be P∪{← salary(abby,o)}. The protection
mechanism won’t return a result. Since α2500 = 1, the protection
mechanism will not answer the first query of this equivalence
class 2500. As it is the first query, the observer cannot deduce
anything about the input parameter. In fact, the input parameter
could be any element of {abby,bob,carla}.
Let Query 2 be P∪{← salary(abby,o)}. The protection
mechanism will return {o 7→ 2500} as a result. This is the sec-
ond query in the class 2500, the protection mechanism will reply
by giving the substitution answer. By giving the substitution an-
swer of a query belonging to the equivalence class 2500, the
observer is now sure that the first query concerns the same class
2500.
Let Query 3 be P∪ {← salary(bob,o)}. The protection
mechanism will return {o 7→ 2500} as a result. The is the third
query in the class 2500, the protection mechanism will reply
by giving the substitution answer. The observer learns nothing
more from the third query.
Let Query 4 be P∪{← salary(carla,o)}. The protection
mechanism won’t return a result. Since α2400 = 1, the protection
mechanism will not answer the first query of this equivalence
class 2400. As the observer knew that a previously asked query
concerned the equivalence class 2500 and returned no answer,
the current returned result no answer necessarily concerns the
equivalence class 2400, and thus, the observer is able to state
that the hidden input parameter for this query is carla.
Thus, the random numbers α associated to each equivalence
class should not be disclosed to the observer.
Let us now show that the protection mechanism is secure.
For this, we need to define what is meant by ’the observer can
infer the exact value of the hidden input parameter’. For this,
we associate to the query sequences issued by the user, a vector
of the observed substitution answers. Formally, for the query se-
quence Q = {P∪{← p(a1,o1},P∪{← p(a2,o2}, · · · ,P∪{←
p(an,on}}, we associate the observed returned results in terms
of substitution answers Θ= (θ1,θ2, · · · ,θn).
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We say that the observer can guess the exact value of a
hidden input parameter ai, if for the corresponding θi, and in all
the query vectors {P∪{← p(a1,o1},P∪{← p(a2,o2}, · · · ,P∪
{← p(an,on}}, ai have the same value.
Let us show now that our mechanism is secure.
Suppose that the logic program is composed by at least two
facts (the case where the logic program is composed by 1 fact
is trivial, as the hidden input parameter is unique). Suppose
that there exists a substitution answer θi for which ai has the
same value in all the query vectors {P∪{← p(a1,o1},P∪{←
p(a2,o2}, · · · ,P∪{← p(an,on}}, that is
θ(p(ai,oi)) = θi.
Thus, for this θi, there is a unique associated input parameter
ai. Furthermore, there is a unique fact of the form p(ai,b)←
with θ(p(ai,oi)) = {oi 7→ b}.
But, according to the protection mechanism; for each equiva-
lence class of cardinal 1, the associated returned answer by the
mechanism is no answer. So, in this case, θi = ε (ε is used to
note the no answer returned value).
Thus, seeing that for θi = ε , there is one associated input param-
eter ai, this means that the logic program is composed by one
fact only, because according to the mechanism, a no answer
should be returned to one of the queries in each equivalence
class (or to all the queries for equivalence classes with cardinal-
ity equal to 1). Note that for θi = ε , there should be a number of
distinct ai equal to the number of different equivalence classes
in the program. This contradicts the fact that the logic program
is composed by at least two facts.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we used some definitions of information flow
for Datalog logic programs to introduce the notion of flow in-
distinguishability level. We proposed an equivalence relation
between the elements of the Herbrand universe relatively for a
Datalog logic program P. We showed that the notion of indis-
tinguishability proposed, coincides with the one presented in
[13, 14] since practically it suffices to find two indistinguishable
classes to state that an information flow passes from x to y in the
goal P∪{G(x,y)}. Based on the notion of equivalence classes,
we proposed also the definition of the level of an information
flow. Algorithms were proposed to calculate this level, and this
for the two definitions of information flow, namely, based on
success/failure and substitution answers. We then discussed the
specifications of the flow and give an example to emphasize the
fact that the result returned by the query can convey confidential
information.
To control this, we focused on the notion of inference control
and we proposed definitions of protection mechanisms, secure
mechanisms, precise mechanisms and confidentiality policies.
We ended by giving an example of a secure and precise protec-
tion mechanism that prohibits any undesirable inferences and
minimizes the number of denials of legitimate actions.
As a future work, one can first conduct thorough experiments
and comparisons between the different mechanisms proposed in
the litterature. It is desirable to investigate the defintion of flow
detection mechanism for logic programs based on bisimulation
[13]. It is tempting to check whether protection mechanisms,
secure mechanisms, precise mechanisms and confidentiality
policies could be expressed using this defintion.
Moreover, since nowadays, security in distributed systems is
an important issue, one can try to couple the works of [8] and
[16] to study and formalize security mechanisms in distributed
systems.
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